Capital in Transportation, Communications, and Public Utilities: Its Formation and Financing by Melville J. Ulmer
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Capital in Transportation, Communications, and Public
Utilities: Its Formation and Financing





Chapter Title: Résumé and Prospect
Chapter Author: Melville J. Ulmer
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c1497
Chapter pages in book: (p. 174 - 200)CHAPTER 9
Résumé and Prospect
IN this concluding chapter we assemble the principal findings
developed earlier, and briefly appraise their significance for an
understanding of the decades ahead. Our summary consists of five
major parts.
In the first, we focus upon the major characteristics of the growth
of the regulated industries. Here, we review the long-run behavior
of capital formation. Then we embrace the trends of the two
variables which, proximately, determine the secular path of invest-
ment—output and the capital-product ratio. Second, we follow with
a summary of our exploration into the factors underlying these
trends. Third, we recapitulate our findings on the form and nature
of long cycles. Fourth, we review the secular patterns observed in the
financing of the regulated industries, and summarize the explanation
we developed for them. Finally, we essay a brief analysis of the
outlook.
The Secular Pattern of Capital Formation
The productive facilities of the regulated industries,in the
aggregate, experienced a substantial expansion over the period from
1870 to 1950. From about 270 million 1929 dollars per annum in
the first decade of the period, net capital formation rose to more
than one billion per year in the years just preceding World War I.
In subsequent years the growth in facilities was extended, though
the early vigor of the rise slackened somewhat. As a result, the
accumulated stock of physical capital in the regulated industries rose
from about 8 billion 1929 dollars in 1870 to nearly 30 billion around
1910 and to about 47 billion in 1950. Gross capital formation,
supported by swiftly growing capital replacement requirements,
advanced from less than one-half billion 1929 dollars per annum in
the 1870's to more than five times this amount in the post-World
War II period.
Great as the expansion was, it did not keep pace over the eighty-
year span of study with that of the nation as a whole. The regulated
industries accounted for about 15 per cent of the nation's gross
capital formation in the 1870's, about 20 per cent in the years
preceding World War I, and no more than 10 per cent in the period
following World War II. The per capita value of plant and equip-
ment in the regulated industries, measured in 1929 dollars, was 221
in 1870, 368 in 1930, and 321 in 1950. Here, and in the subsequent
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discussion of this section, references to capital in all cases pertain to
quantities measured in constant dollars.Furthermore,inthe
regulated industries plant and equipment are taken as the total
stock of reproducible capital,the small amount of inventories
typically held being neglected. Capital formation, accordingly,
refers to accumulations of plant and equipment.
The main components of the regulated industries segregated for
special study include steam railroads, electric light and power,
telephones, street and electric railways, and local bus lines. This
quintuplet in the 1880's, insofar as its elements were in operation,
accounted for about 90 per cent, and in the 1940's still took as much
as 70 per cent, of the gross flow of investment of all regulated
industries. The progress of capital formation in the five components
over the period from 1870 to 1950 exhibited a number of significant
characteristics in common. This feature of their behavior invited the
use of a model pattern both as a descriptive device, and as a frame-
work for comparative analysis. The model has the following proper-
ties. The secular path of net capital formation rises at an increasing
rate, passes through an inflection point, and then continues its
advance at a diminishing rate until its peak is attained. Subsequently
itdeclines,after a time reaching zero and ultimately turning
negative. The stock of capital follows a similar secular course, at
least up to contact with the zero line. Its inflection point, however,
is coincident with the peak in net capital formation. Its own peak
is achieved when net capital formation becomes zero. We omit, for
conciseness, the subsequent stages of the pattern, through which
only street railways of all our components progressed in any
significant degree.
Indeed, the degree of progression along the model secular pattern
varied widely among our components. Judged by this standard, the
most youthful was telephones. In this industry none of the key
stages of the model pattern had by 1950 been completed, either in
the growth of its stock of capital or of its net capital formation. Both
rose at absolute rates which expanded progressively throughout the
eighty-year span of study. Net capital formation in telephones
averaged 240 million 1929 dollars per annum in the 1940's, more
than twice the rate of the 1920's. The stock of capital increased
fivefold between 1900 and 1930, and in the next twenty years
doubled again.
The most mature of the components was street railways—an
industry whose life span in nearly its entirety is covered by the period
studied. In this component the application of electricity stimulated
a spectacular advance in net capital formation, which, however,
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soon reached its peak in the middle of the first decade of the
twentieth century. Net investment then turned downward swiftly,
diminishing at an increasing rate until it reached zercl around 1916.
At that point the stock of capital was at its peak. Subsequent con-
traction brought it down to about 770 million 1929 dollars in 1950,
compared to facilities with value of nearly four billion 35 years
earlier.
Of the other components, steam railroads came closest to matching
the maturity of the street railways—though itsti],1 remained a
substantial distance away. In railroads the changeover from an
increasing to a decreasing rate of growth in the stock of capital—the
secular peak in net capital formation—occurred in the early 1880's;
the crest in the stock of capital itself seems to have been reached in
the early 1930's. But in the years between 1931 and 1950, the railroads
did not progress very far along the following stage. In this period
the constant dollar value of road and equipment declined from 24.1
to 22.6 billion, or by less than 10 per cent.
The remaining components—electric power, local bus lines, and
the all other regulated industries group—were ranged between these
extremes. They had all passed, though at widely different times, the
first stage in the model pattern of development—that is, the point
at which net capital formation changes over from an increasing to a
decreasing rate of advance. But in electric power and the all other
group the signs of maturity went no further. In both, the rate of
growth in 1950 was still very brisk, and the upward trend in net
capital formation showed no clear indication of a termination.
Local bus lines, on the other hand, proceeded one stage further in
the model: in the late 1930's it passed the point at which the secular
path of net investment reached a peak. Of course the stock of capital
continued to head upward in subsequent years, for investment in
buses remained substantial; but the rise from a secular point of view
proceeded by diminishing amounts.
In one respect there is agreement among all components in the
secular trends in the stock of reproducible capital. In all cases, the
relative rate of growth diminished, and from a very early date in the
history of each. Taking changes over successive long cycles, the
secular rate of advance in the regulated industries in the aggregate
dropped from 3 per cent per annum to 1.6 per cent and finally to
less than 0.1 per cent annually. In the railroads there was a drop
from 2 per cent to less than 1 per cent and finally to a slightly
negative annual change. Electric light and power dropped from an
annual increase of nearly 20 per cent during the first cycle to about
5 per cent in the second and to less than 1 per cent in the third.
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Over the entire time span, in telephones there was a reduction from
a rate of nearly 12 per cent to one of less than 3 per cent, and in
electric railways from an 8 per cent per annum rise to an average
annual decline of nearly 6 per cent. Local bus lines, during its brief
history dropped from an average increase of nearly 40 per cent to
one of less than 8 per cent. Only in the all other group was the
decline anything but constantly progressive. In this case the rate of
growth remained unchanged at slightly more than 3 per cent during
the first two cycles, and then dropped to 0.5 per cent in the final
swing. Though inevitable, ultimately, in any industry, the early
incidence of the tendency toward a retarded rate of growth was
attributed in the body of this report to special characteristics
surrounding the genesis of the regulated segment.
Barring a dramatic alteration in the average life of capital, the
trend just described implies a necessary relationship over time
between net capital formation and capital consumption. Unavoid-
ably, the latter must match the former at a very early date, and then
spring far ahead. Such was the case in the aggregate of the regulated
industries and in each of the components. In the decade of the
1940's, when investment was extraordinarily high, capital con-
sumption in the total of the regulated industries was three times as
great as net capital formation; in the railroads it was twenty-five
times, in local bus lines and the all other group three times, and in
electric power two times as great as net capital formation. In tele-
phones they were equal, but in tribute to the surge of investment in
the last decade covered by our study, it was the first time since the
1890's that net capital formation had been so large in relation to
capital consumption. Thus in all components in recent years (street
railways remained in the process of contraction), large replacement
requirements were the dominant element in the gross flow of capital.
It is significant that an investment of nearly two billion 1929 dollars
was required annually in the 1940's simply to keep the physical
stock of capital of the regulated industries intact, and that more
than one-fourth of the two billion was accounted for by railroads.
As suggested, the trend in the gross flow of capital presents a
relatively buoyant picture. Even in the railroads, the sharp down-
ward movement evident in net investment is almost obliterated in
gross capital formation. In all other components except street
railways, the trend of gross investment was distinctly upward. In the
aggregate of the regulated industries, it leaped from less than 500
million 1929 dollars per annum in the 1870's to 2.6 billion in the
1920's and to more than 3.0 billion per annum in the years immedi-
ately following World War II. In the latter period it represented
177RÉSUMÉ AND PROSPECT
from 25 to 30 per cent of the national total of gross capital expen-
ditures on plant and equipment by all nonagricultural industry.
Secular Trends in Production
The model pattern of growth employed in the analysis of capital
formation may also be applied to production. In this framework,
output is analogous to the stock of capital, and changes in output
are analogous to net capital formation. The trends in these two
categories, in general, differ widely but systematically. In particular,
the regulated industries appear considerably less mature when
judged by the behavior of production rather than by that of capital
formation. In the aggregate, output of the regulated industries rose
by progressively increasing amounts throughout the 1880—1950 span
for which records are available. So did the increments in output.
Trends of the same kind prevailed in telephones, electric power, and
the all other group. The latter two components, as well as the
aggregate of the regulated industries, had been in an appreciably
later stage of development when appraised from the standpoint of
capital formation. At least they had each reached the point at which
net capital formation (analogous to output increments) had ceased
to rise by increasing amounts.
Railroads and local bus lines ranked on a par when judged by the
production maturity standard, each having completed the first two
stages of the model pattern. In both cases the secular trend of pro-
duction in the 1940's remained upward, but its rise progressed at a
diminishing rate. In the railroads, it will be recalled, the stock of
capital had reached its peak in the early 1930's. Local bus lines—
alone among the components, except for telephones—reached the
same stage of growth in output and in capital formation. Street
railways had a slightly more youthful look in the production frame-
work, though output in 1950 was heading secularly downward, and
had been tending in this direction for at least twenty-five years.
Thus the relative rank of the industries with respect to maturity
is nearly the same when judged by the behavior of production as by
that of capital formation. But in the former framework, the various
components appear to be in significantly earlier stages of develop-
ment, reflecting systematic changes intheir respective capital
coefficients. The most striking feature in the behavior of their
production in the aggregate, however, was the vigor of its rise.
Measured in 1929 dollars, it rose from a little more than one billion
in the 1880's to nearly twelve billion in the 1920's and to nearly
twenty-six billion in the 1940's. Of course, over almost the entire
1880—1950 period the relative rate of increase in output diminished—
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in the aggregate and in each of the components. But as might be
expected from the trend patterns already defined, the reductions
were not quite as great as the corresponding ones in capital formation,
and the rates of increase prevailing were generally higher.
Capital Coefficients
It is thus apparent that capital formation failed by a considerable
margin to reflect the full vigor of the growth of output. The coeffi-
cients relating these variables were patently subject to constant
change. In the analysis of this relationship, two concepts were
distinguished: the average and marginal capital-product ratios.
The first may be defined as ,whereC is the stock of reproducible
capital and 0 is the volume of output, both measured in constant
dollars. The marginal capital-product ratio may be defined as the
ratio between the change in the stock of reproducible capital and
the change in output, similarly measured—i.e. as
Over the seventy-year period for which records are available, the
trends of average and marginal capital-product ratios in the regulated
industries are marked by abrupt decline. The average ratio in
the aggregate dropped from about 12 in the 1880's to 6.5 at the turn
of the century, to 3.5 in the 1920's, and to 1.7 in 1950. In railroads
the reduction was also continuous—and at a diminishing rate—
throughout the period of study, after allowance for cyclical varia-
tions, dropping over the span from 16 in the 1880's to 3 in 1950. In
the other components the reductions were more irregular, totally
apart from those fluctuations common to them all, which stem from
cyclical revisions iii the level of business activity. In telephones and
electric power, the first decade of operation was characterized by a
rise in the ratio. So were the earlier years in street railways in which
electrification was accomplished. Significant interruptions in the
long-run decline occurred in addition in electric power in the first
twelve years of the twentieth century, and in telephones in the late
1920's and1930's.Nevertheless,theover-all reductions were
extensive: from the 1890's to 1950, the ratio dropped from 15 to 2
in electric power, from 5 to somewhat less than 2 in telephones,
from 6 to 2 in street railways, and from 10 to I in the all other group.
Moreover, the trends in general exhibited the common characteristic
of gradually losing momentum. In the aggregate, in railroads, and
for most of the period in electric power, they were described with
considerable accuracy by the downward branch of a Gompertz curve.
Only in local bus lines is there a material departure from the
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general pattern, though it must be borne in mind that the history
of the industry is very brief. In this component the ratio rose from
about 0.5 in the mid-1920's to 1.7 in 1950. Part of this advance was
due to short-run factors relating to the war and its aftermath; but
part was also due to distinctive characteristics of this component.
The trend of the marginal capital-product ratio was also downward
in every industry group except local bus lines. Measuring changes
from peak to peak in the first long cycle and from peak to peak in
the last of the long swings in the 1880—1950 span, the ratio declined
from 9 to 0.4 in the aggregate of all regulated industries, from 10 to
—0.2 in railroads, from 17 to 0.6 in electric power, from 5 to 2 in
telephones, from 6 to 4 in Street railways, and from 11 to 0.4 in the
all other group. The negative ratio during the last cycle in the rail-
roads indicates that during the years 1927 through 1950 output
increased while the stock of capital was being contracted. Thus,
with a minor exception, advances in output over the period were
accompanied by progressively smaller amounts of capital formation
—in each of the regulated industries as well as in the aggregate.
And the dimension of this change in the long-run relationship between
demand for final product and investment was very substantial.
It may be noted that the average capital-product ratio in the
regulated industries has in all periods greatly exceeded that pre-
vailing in other segments of the economy, although in the light of the
trends described above, the differences have diminished over time.
In manufacturing in 1948 the capital-product ratio was 0.65,
compared with 1.7 in the regulated industries. In mining the ratio
was 1.3. Differences in the amount of capital consumed per dollar of
output, however, are much smaller than the disparities would
suggest. The average life of capital is appreciably longer in the
regulated industries than in either of the other two segments.
Underlying Factors
As suggested above, the secular behavior of net capital formation
may be illumined by an analysis of factors which appear to shape
the long-run trends in output increments and in the marginal
capital-product ratio. We proceed to a summary of these factors.
OUTPUT
In the early days of the regulated industries a rate of growth was
established far greater than that of any possible long-run sustaining
factors. This is recorded distinctly for each of our components. For
example, in the 1890's, shortly after the beginnings of electric power,
its output amounted to 31 cents per person in the United States,
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0.07 per cent of the gross national product, and 0.2 per cent of our
rough measure of urban income. A decade later per capita output
had increased five times, its proportion of the gross national product
had quadrupled, and its proportion of urban income had tripled.
Similar spectacular advances were made in the same period by the
budding telephone industry and by street railways, which as a
virtually new industry was in the process of electrification.
Here is a manifestation of what we have termed the vacuum effect.
It is characterized by the rush of resources into a segment of the
economy in which profit opportunities appear extraordinarily high.
Its power is always great, though it must depend, ultimately, on the
size, flexibility, and mobility of available resources, and on the
relative magnitude of the demands made upon them. It is fed by the
overthrow of the competitive opposition of older industries. It is
nurtured also by an income elasticity of demand which in a new
industry, destined for success, is almost certain for a time to exceed
the critical level of unity. It is ensured, temporarily at least, by the
fact that the earliest productive units established will fall far short
of the capacity the market may at the time successfully absorb. This
is a virtual technological necessity in a nation as large and as
sprawling as the United States, and is only reinforced by the fact
that caution and experiment are typical business characteristics.
Moreover, far-reaching technological improvements are almost
certain in an industry's earlier years, and add even further to its
powers of expansion. In the face of a potential market which is
obviously growing swiftly and is far above the level that existing
facilities can exploit, innovators extend capacity as rapidly as
possible. Reports of their successes attract imitators from an ever-
wider range. Capital is risked with steadily mounting confidence.
All these factors in concert push output forward at a rate far in
excess of the growth of the nation's aggregate purchasing power,
urbanization, or any other factor which in the long run could
sustain it. This was true, in the earlier years, of all the components
of the regulated industries.
So great was the power of the vacuum effect in the regulated
industries that some ultimate decline in the relative rate of growth
was inevitable in later years. However, the performance of the
components studied varied greatly. In some, a number of "invigor-
ating" factors served to support the pace of output at a relatively
high level throughout the period of study. In others, "retarding"
influences gained the upper hand. Among the invigorating factors
were:
1. The development of new uses for the product. In this category
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was the gradual extension in the uses of electricity to stoves, refrig-
erators, dishwashers, and a variety of other household and industrial
appliances.
2. Virtual immunity from competition. For technical as well as
institutional reasons, telephone service was so situated.
3. Technological innovations and mass production. These en-
couraged consumption by permitting price reductions relative to the
general price level.
4. Propitious social changes making for favorable shifts in con-
sumer tastes. One change was the swift pace of urbanization in the
United States, with favorable impact on nearly all of the regulated
industries.
All of the invigorating factors were especially influential in the
development of the electric power and telephone industries. Owing
to their effects, the early swift rise of output in the two components
was extended so that throughout the 1880—1950 span production
rose at an ever-increasing absolute rate. But even in these vigorously
growing components, retarding influences were manifest, though
always overshadowed. Contrariwise, in our other components the
invigorating influences were weak and the retarding factors stronger,
so that the pace of production was perceptibly dampened and—as
we have seen—these industries moved farther along the model
pattern of growth on the road to maturity. The retarding influences
were:
1. Ultimately,theolder relatedindustries were completely
crushed, or thrust into a smaller facet of their function, which for
some reason remained impregnable. Future advances, then, could
not be fed by business stripped from competitors.
2. Once mass distribution had been attained, the income elasti-
city of demand tended to decline. This stemmed, in part, from the
complete routing of older competition and the achievement of at
least temporary market saturation. Future advances, at best, were
thus limited only to those arising from national growth
3. Younger industries producing related goods or services ulti-
mately arose to offer competition.
4. The very power of the vacuum effect tended to induce some
later reduction in the rate of growth of output. The longer it lasted,
the greater grew the danger of overextension.
Production of all industries in their earliest years expanded far
more rapidly than the gross national product or even urban income.
In electric light and power and in telephones this condition persisted
throughout the 1880—1950 span. Nevertheless, even in these vigor-
ously growing components, retarding influences were atleast
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modestly in evidence. For electric utilities, there was the competition
of public power. For telephones there was some indication of market
saturation—i.e. a declining elasticity of demand, both with respect
to price and income. Hence the differential in the rate of growth of
the two industries, over their long-run sustaining factors, was
gradually and quite significantly narrowed, although in both cases
the rate continued slightly above that of urban income. For the
special invigorating factors, so pronounced, had barely begun to
peter out.
Railroads, street railways, and local bus lines lack the virtual
immunity from competition characteristic of telephones. They also
lack the technical resiliency which has enabled electric light and
power to find a succession of new uses. Their older competitors—
canals, horse-drawn vehicles, etc.—had long since been routed. The
vacuum effect in these components subsided at an early date in the
period of our study, and invigorating influences, tending to prolong
swift growth, were weak. Thus, new competition proved swiftly
crushing for Street railways and slowly but firmly limited the growth
of the railroads. For local bus lines, the chief retarding factor appears
to have been a declining income elasticity of demand.
Accordingly, in 1950 production by street railways amounted to
0.2 per cent of the gross national product, less than one-sixth of the
proportion prevailing just before World War I. For railroads the rate
of increase in output dropped from one which far exceeded that of
the gross national product before World War I to one which did
little more than match the growth of population. In 1950 railroad
output amounted to about fifty-six dollars per person, at 1929
prices, approximately the same as thirty years earlier. The rate of
growth of production by local bus lines had also fallen significantly
below that of the gross national product. Of course, during the
period of the vacuum effect, growth in all three had been sufficiently
great to exceed even that of the swiftly advancing urban income.
It may be noted that the growth of production in the all other group
of regulated industries topped that of the gross national product and of
urban income throughout the 1880—1950 span, reflecting the develop-
ment of new industries. For all regulated industries in the aggregate,
production rose from 7 per cent of the gross national product in
1890 to 12 per cent in 1910, to 14 per cent in 1930, and to 17 per
cent in 1950, remembering that output is here measured as gross of
the materials consumed. The pace of this advance was also greater
than that of urban income up to the time of World War I; from
that date onward the ratio of the output of all regulated industries
to urban income was virtually steady.
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CAPITAL-PRODUCT RATIOS
Underlying the trend of the capital-product ratio in the regulated
industries was a definite sequence of events which was common to
all components. The variations in capital-product ratio trends
observed among the different segments are attributable to differences
in the intensity and duration of the elements of this sequence. The
general pattern may be described in terms of these stages.
Initially, there was a period of gestation in which preparatory
investment was made on a wide scale, and many large indivisible
units were started and only gradually brought to completion. This
inaugural build-up was unusually large in the regulated industries,
for a number of reasons including technological characteristics, the
distant horizons envisaged by utility-builders, and the speculation
which was rife at this stage in some of the components. Of course,
actual output in this period was necessarily small, and the capital-
product ratio rose.
But this introductory stage was, by nature, short-lived. It could
last only so long as new plants were established at a faster pace than
output rose in facilities that were brought to completion. The
duration was less than a decade in the regulated industries for which
relevant data are available. Furthermore, it should be recalled that
in the aggregate of utilities this initial increase in the ratio for electric
light and power, for telephones, and for electric railways was over-
shadowed by the sharp decline simultaneously in progress for the
older industries—especially steam railroads and some of the older
components included in the all other group. The capital-product
ratio in the regulated industries as a whole accordingly moved
downward throughout the 1880—1950 span. In manufacturing, the
initial period of extensive expansion, characterized by the rise of a
multitudeof new firms and new industries, was accompanied and
followed by the sweep of pervasive capital-demanding innovations
which were the earmark of the industrial revolution. As a result the
capital-product ratio remained on the rise until World War I or
somewhat later.
The second stage of the pattern is a natural outgrowth of the first
and followed swiftly in the regulated industries. Once many large
installations were completed, output was free to expand with rela-
tively little additional investment necessary. The capital-product
ratio was therefore profoundly depressed.
In the third stage the drop in the capital-product ratio was per-
petuated. Capital-saving inventions enhanced the efficiency of plant
and equipment. These took the form, primarily, of piecemeal
improvements in existing facilities.In some cases, the physical
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capital stock was also put to more economical use. In addition, the
growing relative importance of capital consumption, in the company
of general technological advance, ensured that the stock of capital
would be replaced at a progressively faster rate with units capable of
greater productive service. Finally, the expansion of accrued depre-
ciation served to depress the net stock of capital, as ordinarily
measured, in relation to that actually in use. For all of the foregoing
reasons the capital-product ratio continued downward even after•
the influences at work in the second stage had completely lost their
force. It is certain that these factors were significant not only in the
regulated industries, but—in whole or in part—in many other major
segments of the economy; for, at least since the 1920's, the downward
trend of the capital-product ratio was nationwide.
From the general pattern described there are, to be sure, devia-
tions. Even after the first stage of the pattern had ended, capital-
using innovations occurred in the regulated industries and resulted,
for a time, in rising capital-product ratios. This was the case in the
early 1900's in electric light and power, and in the mid-1920's in
telephones. But such deviations in the seventy-year experience of
our industries have proved temporary. The dominating, pervading
factor among utilities in the long run, once the initial period of
gestation had been surmounted, was the steady flow of capital-saving
devices and the persevering drop in the capital-product ratio.
Among our components, the only one in which this general trend
did not hold was local bus lines. Here, special characteristics of the
industry, together with the particular events of the World War II
period and its aftermath, served to maintain a rising capital-product
ratio throughout the industry's relatively brief history.
In general, the extent of the decline in the capital-product ratio
was closely correlated among industries throughout the nation,
including the regulated segment, with the initial standing of the
ratio. The highest ratios declined the most. This development appears
to be due to three factors: (1) Those components in which particu-
larly high capital-product ratios were achieved were the very ones
in which capital is characterized by a high degree of indivisibility.
In such industries, the way is smoothly paved for a subsequent and
particularly sharp reduction in capital-product ratios as output
expands in later years. (2) The more diverse the physical stock of
capital of an industry, the greater the chance that scientific advances
will result in improving its efficiency. Insofar as diversity is correlated
with the relative size of capital installations,this increases the
opportunityfor improving capitalefficiencyincapital-extensive
industries. (3) There is no upper limit to the capital-product ratio,
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though there is a lower limit at least at zero, and as a practical
matter somewhat above zero. Accordingly, at their peak, capital-
product ratios may be widely scattered. But as they decline, the
presence of a lower limit tends to reduce their dispersion.
The influence of wage and interest rates upon the long-run trend
of capital-product ratios in the regulated industries appears to have
been secondary. Both rising and declining capital-product ratios
were accompanied by advances in labor's productivity, with little,
if any, significant difference in degree. Hence, the stimulus to
economies in the use of labor provided by rising wage rates could—
and did—find satisfactory outlets in both capital-saving and capital-
using innovations. Progressive reductions in interest rates would
(other things being equal) encourage investment in general, and
would facilitate a rise in the capital-product ratio in particular f
suchan advance were generated by other forces. But on the other hand a
decline in the cost of money capita] would not in any way inhibit a
reduction in the capital-product ratio if it were induced by techno-
logical or other conditions. Accordingly, neither the influence of
wage rates nor of interest rates appeared to play a crucial role in
determining the secular pattern of the capital-product ratio in the
regulated industries.
CAPITAL FORMATION
The secular progress of capital formation is thus the result of the
two streams of events already described: (I) those which determine
the secular pattern of output and (2) those which determine the
secular pattern of the capital-product ratio. In the early stage of
development of the regulated industries, investment was generated
in huge dimensions because of the combined operation of the
vacuum effect upon output and the rise in the capital-product ratio
characteristic of the gestation period. But after this period—and
very soon after for most components—the situation altered materi-
ally. The effect of increases in demand for final product upon
investment was significantly dampened by progressive reductions in
the marginal capital-product ratio. Besides, numerous forces com-
bined to retard the growth of output. In general, over the long run,
there was a tendency for capital formation to follow the pattern of
output, but it was in the main a less vigorous version because of the
declining capital-product ratio. Though production in the aggregate
of the regulated industriespersistently outdistanced the gross
national product throughout the period of record, investment, at
least in the later years, barely maintained the much more leisurely
pace of the growth of the population.
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Long Cycles
The capital formation of the regulated industries is characterized
by pronounced long cycles—a fact which at every point materially
complicated the task of defining long-term trends. The cycles lasted
on the average about twenty years. Their amplitude was considerable
—averaging in expansions about 70 per cent, and in contractions
about 40 per cent of the average annual investment during the
cycles as a whole. A chronological as well as a cross section (by
industry) analysis of these fluctuations yielded the following pattern.
In the earlier days of a regulated industry long cycles were barely
evident in the progress of investment, if they appeared at all. Later,
the broad vigorous expansion was interrupted by modest contrac-
tions. Gradually, the contractions deepened while expansions tended
to grow weaker. It was through this process of cyclical behavior that
the sharp upward slope of the secular growth trend slowly diminished,
and ultimately yielded to descension.
Chronologically, however, the tendency for expansions to weaken
over time was offset in part by certain other economy-wide altera-
tions in the environment, so that the magnitude of cycles taken as a
whole increased progressively over the 1870—1950 span. In the post-
World War I period, the swings in the regulated industries were
paralleled by corresponding movements in the general level of
business activity as measured by the gross national product. In these
years, cycles in the two series were reinforcing. Prior to World War I
long cycles in the gross national product appear primarily as swings
in the secular rateofgrowth, and are not pronounced in the absolute
figures. Furthermore, insofar as they do appear, their timing is not
the same as in the regulated industries.
Though unmistakable in capital formation, long cycles are not
pronounced in the output or in the annual output increments of the
regulated industries. However, similar fluctuations—with almost
precisely the same timing—are found in residential construction and
in annual population increments.
Analysis of the duration of long cycles, together with the average
life of capital and the variations about this average, suggests that
they cannot be attributed to the periodic reinvestment impulses
investigated by Johan Einarsen. The transport-buildingcycle
hypothesis of Walter Isard was also rejected on the grounds that (1)
it was impossible to tie each long cycle to a specific transportation
innovation as the theory requires, and (2) a hypothesized relation-
ship was lacking between the timing of cycles in the regulated
industries and in the general level of business activity.It was
suggested that further work along two lines in this area might prove
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fruitful. One would be to explore the connection between swings in
population increments, the gross national product, and investment
in the regulated industries and in housing, as proposed by Kuznets.
The other would concern certain tendencies toward long swings
inherent in the characteristics of the regulated industries and
residential construction, and the nature of the impact of major
business cycles upon investment in this setting. In line with the latter
hypothesis, long swings in the investment of the regulated industries
would be interpreted as a manifestation of the interaction between
this segment and business activity in the economy as a whole,
conditioned by institutional properties peculiar to the segment.
Among these properties are the high durability and great indivisi-
bility of the capital used, the tendency to "bunch" orders of even
the more divisible capital units, the cumbersome nature of capital
budgeting and financing practices, and the considerable length of
the average capital construction period. All these factors inhibit
swift reversals in the direction of investment.
Finance
The physical growth of the regulated industries over the span from
1870 to 1950 was coupled with an expanding need for money
capital. The rise in the flow of money capital was further supported,
however, by the secular upward drift in the price level over the
eighty-year span, and by the advances in the relative prices of capital
goods. In current prices, the gross capital expenditures of the
regulated industries amounted to between 200 and 300 million
dollars per year in the 1870's and 1880's; by 1950 they aggregated
6.4 billion dollars. The value in current dollars of their stock of
plant and equipment approached 80 billion at the beginning of
1950, against about 5 billion in the 1870's. In the financing of the
huge capital requirements implied by these figures, two outstanding
changes occurred over theeighty years for which data were
assembled. First, there was a gradual, steady, and pronounced shift
from external to internal financing. Second, there was a shift in the
form of external financing from stocks to bonds.
Over the period of record, which differed somewhat among the
several components, the proportion of internal sources to total
sources of funds rose from 2 to 100 per cent for the railroads, from
8 to 50 per cent for electric power, from 6 to 41 per cent for tele-
phones, and from 1 to 14 per cent for street railways. These changes
were analyzed in terms of the equation:
ab + Icr
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where risthe proportion of all sources of capital provided by
retained profits and depreciation, a is the ratio of net savings to
profits, b is the ratio of profits to total assets in current prices, k is
the ratio of depreciation charges to total assets1 in current prices,
is the ratio of net capital flow to total assets in current prices, and
jisthe ratio of capital consumption at replacement cost to total
assets in current prices.
Other things equal, the formula shows that the rate of internal
financing (r)willvary directly with the net savings rate (a), with the
profit rate (b) and with the depreciation rate (k).It will vary
inversely with the net rate of capital flow ()andthe rate of capital
consumption (9). Experimentally, it was possible to test the influence
of some of these factors separately.
It was found that the rise in the rate of internal financing in the
regulated industries was attributable in the main to two factors:
(1) The need for correcting the initial deficiencies in capital con-
sumption allowances which existed in the earlier years of our period
of study. Depreciation charges in the latter decades of the nineteenth
century were by a substantial margin inadequate to provide for the
prevailing rate of capital consumption. (2) The expanding import-
ance of capital consumption relative to all uses of capital over the
period of study, springing from the retarded rate of growth of total
assets. The latter trend mirrored, primarily, the retarded rate of
growth of output together with the declining capital-product ratio.
Thus, alluding to our first factor, even if the regulated industries'
rate of growth had been unchanged over the seventy years studied,
a substantial increase in the rate of internal financing would have
been necessary to cover replacement. This factor alone would have
been sufficient to boost the gross retention rate from 2 to 42 per cent
in railroads, from less than 8 to 24 per cent in electric power, from
6 to 30 per cent in telephones, and from one to 27 per cent in street
railways. When the second factor—retarded rate of growth over the
period—is taken into account, a possible explanation is provided
for the entirety of the observed rise in the rate of internal financing.
Thus, it was found that the influence of the decline in the net rate
of capital flow was sufficient to induce a further boost in the gross
retention rate of from 42 to 92 per cent in railroads, from 24 to 58
per cent in electric power, from 30 to 46 per cent in telephones, and
from 27 to 150 per cent in street railways. In the first three compo-
nents the aggregate "hypothetical" advance in the retention rate
was roughly the same as had actually occurred over the period
1880—1950. In street railways the hypothetical advance was much
greater than the actual one, indicating that in the later years in this
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component internally generated funds were insufficient to meet
capital consumption requirements. This situation was symptomatic
of both the financial difficulties which many Street railways were
then encountering and of the fact that this component was in the
process of contraction.
The shift in the form of external financing, from stocks to bonds,
was also pronounced and pervasive. The use of long-term debt is—
and always has been—far greater in the regulated industries than
in the other segments of the economy. It is encouraged by the form
of public regulation as well as by certain other characteristics of
these components. Its extension over time probably reflected in part
the growth of public regulation in addition to the shift toward
internal financing which boosted the value of existing equity claims.
The trend was further promoted by certain economy-wide influences
such as the adoption and subsequent rise in the corporation income
tax. But the importance of special factors is attested by the much
more pronounced trend evident in the regulated industries. The
proportion of external funds secured through bonds in the railroads
rose from 56 per cent in the 1880's to 70 per cent in the 1920's, after
which external sources in general sank to negligible dimensions. In
electric power the rise was from 43 per cent in the years before 1912
to 58 per cent in the 1940's. In telephones bonds accounted for 22
per cent of net new issues in the 1890's and for 85 per cent in the
1940's. In the brief span of the expansion of street railways, bonds
advanced from 44 to 100 per cent of the external sources of long-
term capital. Reflecting these trends, the relative importance of
bonds in the capital structure by the 1940's was three times
greater in the regulated industries than in all other nonfinancial
corporations.
The Outlook
Despite the economic, political, and social turbulence of the
eighty years from 1870 to 1950, the continuity of development in the
regulated industries over this period is impressive. Our analysis
disclosed the evolution of economic patterns of several kinds, em-
bodying the intricate sequences of secular growth. The patterns
themselves may be viewed as chains, in which the links from begin-
fling to end are related events over successive units of time. In our
segment of study, no breaks are revealed in these chains—no sudden
discontinuities in which the events of one period of time are divorced
from all perceptible relationship with those which have gone before,
or those which come later. It is from this point of view that some-
thing may be said of the secular growth of the regulated industries
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in the years ahead. For knowledge of the factors which have shaped
development in the 1870—1950 period must necessarily illumine
long-run prospects.
We shall now focus briefly on the outlook through 1975. No
specific forecast will be attempted. The problems involved in such
an undertaking would extend well beyond the boundaries established
for this study. The discussion will be confined to reflections, primarily
qualitative, concerning the identity, power, and direction of the
principal forces likely to shape the growth of the regulated industries
over the twenty years ahead. A reasonably concise discussion neces-
sitates the assumption that over the years through 1975 there will be
no major wars.
One lesson from the past is that the simplest projections of the
future are nearly certain to be seriously defective. To suggest, for
example, that investment in the regulated industries will proceed in
the future at the same percentage rate as that which prevailed in
some period of the past would ignore the role of long cycles, the
connection between demand for final product and capital formation,
the susceptibility of the capital-product ratio to change, and the
shifting role of other factors such as technology and competition in
different stages of development. By the same token, some other
popular and somewhat more sophisticated approaches are ruled out.
Thus, to project output of the regulated industries at some constant
ratio to the gross national product or to population would violate
the pattern of the past in which such relationships have been subject
to constant modification. And to derive investment from this pro-
jection by applying the currently prevailing capital-product ratio
would ignore the virtual certainty that this ratio in the future will
differ materially. In accord with the logic of our own historical
analysis, an effort to illumine the future of investment must be
directed,initially,tothe factors underlying demand forfinal
product.
Fundamental, of course, is the future growth of the nation as a
whole. But even if some plausible assumptions are made concerning
the growth of the population and its income, an analysis of the
probable role of the regulated industries must grapple with a host
of specific circumstances conditioning their relative behavior. The
particular influences—summarized in the vacuum effect—which
generated the spectacular advance in the years prior to World War I
have obviously disappeared for all major components. Hence, a
conflict of invigorating and retarding factors remains to be ap-
praised. Virtually by definition, the latter are in ascension and the
former in decline in established industries. Diminishing rates of
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growth in production are universal among our components. And in
some, reductions are in progress relative to the nation's growth. But
differences in degree of retardation are enormous.
Output in the Street railway component has for some time tended
downward absolutely, and no element of importance in past develop-
ment can be employed for supporting a reversal of this trend. No
grounds exist for supposing that the competition of the other means
of transportation will abate. Nor is there any likelihood that the
range of innovation possible within the framework of Street railways
can overcome the fundamental advantages of competitors. The
general pattern of growth described earlier, however, suggests one
alteration in the pace of the decline of this component. The absolute
reductions in output from year to year should diminish. This would
continue a tendency noticeable in the immediate past. It reflects
simply the fact that the industry is reduced gradually to a smaller
number of remaining strongholds in which street railways enjoy
some particularly favorable adaptation, or in which bus lines and
passenger cars face unusual obstacles which are but slowly sur-
mounted. The industry's progresstoultimate extinction thus
becomes more and more reluctant.
In much diminished degree, railroads also face progressive en-
croachment from competitors. But output inthis component
remained secularly upward throughout the period of study. Will
this pace be maintained over the next twenty years? Here we en-
counter not only the fundamental advantages of competitors, but
certain basic advantages retained by the component itself. The rate
of expansion in the output of the railroads had been reduced to well
below the pace of the gross national product to approximately—
since World War I—the rate of growth of the population. The
inherent advantages of trucks and air transportation herald further
inroads. None of those factors which we have termed invigorating
is likely in the case of the railroads to spur an accelerated extension
of activity. On the other hand, some facets of remaining business—
e.g. long hauls for bulky and heavy commodities—are more nearly
impregnable than others. It would not conflict with past patterns of
growth to suppose that the output of the railroads will continue
upward over the next twenty years, nor to suppose that the pace of
its advance will become subject to further retardation. Indeed, an
extension in this segment of the trend toward retardation in the rate
of growth poses the possibility of a decline before 1975 in railroad
output per capita. This would not preclude future substantial
increases in the absolute volume of railroad output, for they will
depend in part upon the trend in population itself.
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Continued growth, though at a materially slower pace, seems also
in prospect for local bus lines. For the most important invigorating
factor present in the early days of this industry had by 1950 been
sharply reduced in importance. This was the presence of numerous
cities in which streetcars had not yet been replaced by buses. By the
1950's, the opposition had been almost completely crushed. Also, on
the retarding side, it appeared that with higher incomes American
families were depending in greater degree upon the private passenger
car for local transportation. The pace in the advance in local bus
lines had begun to fall behind that of the gross national product. It
still remained above that of the growth of population. Perhaps it
will converge with the latter, or possibly dip somewhat lower in the
score of years ahead, under the pressure of an income elasticity of
demand materially less than unity. This is the prospect indicated,
if we assume that the direction of the forces now influencing demand
in this component are by nature irreversible. Perhaps the most
important possibility of reversibility lies in the competitive relation
between the bus and the private passenger automobile. If traffic
conditions worsen, and the use of private cars is limited further, the
bus will be the chief benefactor. (See note 10, page 92.)
This leaves the three most vigorously growing components—
electric power, telephones, and the all other group. In all three cases
the pace of growth was geared more closely to that of urbanization
than to the somewhat slower rate of expansion of the gross national
product. Nevertheless, the differential had narrowed progressively.
In telephones the principal retarding influence was apparently
gradual market saturation. Increases in national income lent a
progressively weaker stimulus to output as an ever larger proportion
had acquired access to, and used, communication facilities. Con-
tinuance of past trends for this component would suggest a reduction
in the rate of growth over the period ahead to a level not much
above that of the population.
Evidence of retardation was less pronounced in electric power. A
rise more rapid than that of population appears assured for some
time to come by the wide expansion in household uses gradually
extending throughout the country. Industrial uses might also be
somewhat further extended if it becomes technically possible to
reduce costs through the application of atomic energy. Yet it would
appear that the size of the electric power industry must depend more
and more upon the growth of the nation itself. The special invigor-
ating influences of its earlier days—such as the vacuum effect, the
crushing of competition, radical innovations of the basic techno-
logical framework—have either passedentirely or have been
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materially diminished in degree. The expansion of public power,
while limited, is a retarding factor which must not be overlooked.
A growth rate much in excess of that of the gross national jroduct,
therefore, could persist only if some important new uses for electric
power were developed. In the absence of these, in the decades ahead,
the output of electric power should continue to converge toward
that of the gross national product; in so doing, of course, it would
continue a trend long in progress.
With respect to the prospects of the heterogeneous all other group,
of course, less can be said of specific character. Experience would
suggest, however, that if any new industry were developed in the
immediate future to become part of this group, it would require
considerably more than twenty years to assume substantial impor-
tance among the regulated industries in the aggregate—particularly
since no such industry is now on the horizon. The declining rate of
growth of the group as it stands has evidenced the passing of the
vacuum effect in some of the leading elements such as trucking and
air transportation. But the persistent vigor of these and some of the
other industries included, such as gas utilities, has limited the decline
in the group's rate of growth narrowly. Even in the course of the
most recent years this component's expansion has outdistanced that
of the economy as a whole by a considerable amount. A continuation
of the modest decline in its rate of growth over the next twenty years
would leave it still somewhat above the pace maintained by the
gross national product over the last several decades.
Thus the general pattern of development, as shaped in the past,
suggests for the next twenty years, taken as a whole, a brisk and
continued expansion in output for the regulated industries in the
aggregate. The limits of the rise, prospectively, are set by the pace
of the growth of the nation. Barring some presently unforeseeable
change, it is difficult to conceive, against the background of the past,
of a future advance in the total output of the regulated industries
much smaller than that of the population, or much greater than that
of the gross national product. This at least is the promise implied
by the patterns of the past, after allowance for the secular changes
in progress or in view. Though brisk, a rise within these limits would
imply a materially slower pace, relative to the nation's growth, than
that which had prevailed secularly at any time previously. This
slackening in the advance of the regulated industries mirrors the
waning of invigorating factors and the rise of the forces of retardation
which have been the faithful concomitants of maturity in the past.
In appraising the outlook for investment, however, the growth in
demand for final product is no more important than the technical
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relationship likely to hold between product and capital. Will the
decline in the capital-product ratio—in progress for so long in the
regulard industries—continue in the years ahead? If so, will its
reduction proceed at a rate which matches, or materially exceeds,
or falls short of; that of the past? Such questions become susceptible
to at least general answers in the present context only if it is under-
stood that reference, as throughout this discussion, isto secular
movements. For both the average and the marginal capital-product
ratios fluctuate widely over short periods of time in response to
cyclical and other short-range factors.
The decline in the capital-product ratio in progress in more recent
years in all of the regulated industries segregated in this analysis,
except local bus lines,has been attributableto capital-saving
innovations. In a larger sense, it represents a concluding chapter in
a technological pattern, a phase of scattered improvements within
an over-all framework which, itself, has embodied the most advanced
basic scientific achievements currently available. Only a techno-
logical revolution—a fundamental change in the framework itself—
can seriously disturb this pattern, and launch a prolonged advance in
the capital-product ratio. Such a revolution would be tantamount to
the rise of a new industry in the place of the old. There is no evidence
of so radical a change in the offing in the regulated industry segment.
Even substantial interruptions (aside, of course, from cyclical
changes) to the reduction of the capital-product ratio have been
uncommon. The incorporation of atomic energy in the generation
of electricity could conceivably occasion in the electric power com-
ponent a material deviation of this kind from the longer-term trend.
But this would reflect a mere period of build-up—during which
capital is created and not yet brought into use. Such periods are by
nature short-lived, as we have seen. The use of atomic energy in this
setting, since it would leave the basic structure of the electric power
industry intact, does not promise to be capital-demanding from a
long-run standpoint. This at least is the prospect suggested by plans
now taking shape in the industry. In a situation in which techno-
logical applications are still so amorphous, however, well-grounded
predictions over any extended period of the future are not possible.
Nothing in the nature of atomic energy rules out the development of
capital-demanding uses, and it may well be that some will materialize
within the next twenty years in connection with one or more of the
industries under review.
Nevertheless, in the light of prospects now in view, something may
be said in support of a continued stream of capital-saving innovations
in the years ahead, in extension of the trend under way for so long
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in the regulated industries. We might expect, of course, that the pace
of the decline in the capital-product ratio in the future will be less
pronounced than in the past. For we have observed the close
correlation between the level of the ratio and the extent of its sub-
sequent decline; we have noted the factors underlying this phenome-
non; and we have witnessed the retardation of its descent in recent
years. But the continuance of its decline, albeit at a diminished rate,
is more likely than a rise in the same sense that technological
revolutions are less frequent—and more dramatically foreshadowed
—than a multiplicity of minor technical refinements. There are no
distinct and present signs of imminent revolutions of this kind.
Not that the capital-saving innovations are necessarily undramatic.
The widely heralded "automation" of industrial processes consists
primarily of capital-saving devices.Thus,the construction of
electronic railroad classification yards, which at present writing is
mainly in the planning stage, promises immense economies in the
use of freight cars. As has been true historically of most capital-
saving devices,the innovation willlikewise reduce manpower
requirements. Generalized, this trend promises that the impact upon
investment of future advances in the demand for final product are
likely to be substantially modified by the changing technical rela-
tions between capital and output. The general patterns previously
described illumine the probable dimensions of this effect. Net capital
formation in the regulated industries in the aggregate had in recent
years fallen appreciably below the pace of the advance of the total
population; i.e. the per capita value of plant and equipment dropped
materially. Owing to the retardation in the growth of output, as
well as the diminishing capital-product ratio,this decline may
proceed in the future. In absolute terms also, the advance in net
capital formation had lost much of its earlier vigor; the secular rate
of increase has clearly dropped since about 1910, and the trend in
the volume of net investment itself appears to have been nearly
horizontal since that date. The general conclusions reached above
all point to an intensification of these signs of secular weakness—
barring, of course, a radical upward shift in the pace of the long-term
growth of the economy as a whole. Mention must be made, too, of
a second fundamental qualification implicit in our analysis. Techno-
logical developments may of course arise at any time, and may be
of sufficient import to alter significantly the capital-product ratio,
the rate of obsolescence on existing capital, or the output prospects
of the regulated industries. Such changes could operate toward
lifting the pace of investment very substantially, and for an extended
period of time. Nor is there any way of predicting technological
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innovations. Their most likely center, as suggested above, is in the
application of atomic energy, and the possibility that particular uses
not now on the horizon may materialize as practical realities.
From a financial standpoint—and with the qualifications cited—
our analysis suggests that the regulated industries will play a more
modest role in capital markets in the twenty years ahead. Of course,
there are probably exceptions within the group, such as air trans-
portation. But the general conclusion appears to hold for the group
as a whole as well as for all the currently more important compo-
nents. The impact of the retarded rate of growth, and the declining
capital-product ratio, on this segment's demand for outside capital
has been reflected in the past by the trends in progress in methods
of financing. Reference, in particular, is to the gradual shift toward
the internal financing of capital requirements notable for all the
components for which relevant data were available. Only a powerful
upward shift in the prospective growth rate of this segment, or a
capital-demanding innovation of huge dimensions—neither of which
is predictable on the basis of current knowledge—would be sufficient
to arrest this trend in the future. Furthermore, persistence of the
trend toward internal financing may be expected to stimulate in
turn a continuance of the shift from stocks to bonds in net new issues.
For while internal financing increased the value of equity claims, it
would also make financially feasible the assumption of a greater
volume of debt. But of course the choice between stocks and bonds
is influenced by other factors, including the attitude of the providers
of capital. Consequently, the nature of the future shifts in this respect
among the regulated industries must remain indefinite.
Assuming that on the basis of the secular patterns defined in
earlier chapters of this book, a particular set of figures had been
established as the most probable trend values of net and gross
capital formation over the years through 1975, at least one further
adjustment would remain necessary for most of the practical uses to
which such projections might be put. This would involve the pro-
vision of some notions concerning the timing of the investment. For
the secular trend is an abstraction, being divorced from long cycles
as well as from other shorter-term fluctuations. And the long cycles
are sufficiently large and extensive to command attention even when
strictly long-range problems are in view. Judging from average
experience in the past, it would be necessary to allow for a long
cycle contraction approximately 40 per cent below the average of the
projected secular trend values, and for an expansion about 70 per
cent above. We would expect the expansion to last 50 per cent
longer than the contraction, with the cycle as a whole covering
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twenty years. We might further adjust the amplitude by allowing
for a secular tendency for contractions to increase in intensity. But
two considerations would remain, which in fact might transcend in
importance the mechanical details already mentioned.
The first would concern the possibility of a discontinuity in
historical experience. It is generally believed that recent advances in
technical knowledge as well as political education have enabled
society to modify business cycle fiuctuation to a much greater degree
than was possible in the past. If this is true, does it not also follow
that long cycles in economic behavior will be materially modified?
It would seem that gradual modification, though certainly not swift
elimination, may indeed be expected. Long cycle contractions have
been accompanied in the past by severe business depressions. If
depressions of major magnitude are avoided, long cycle contractions
will be less extended and less severe. For it has been characteristic
of the latter that investment dropped to levels far below those
justified by secular growth factors. The sharpness of this decline
reflected the collapse of demand as well as of business expectations.
If demand for final product were maintained, the decline in invest-
ment would be more modest. As a result, the succeeding long cycle
expansion, in which investment typically outstrips secular growth
factors, would also be more narrowly limited. In this way the
severity of long swings would be gradually dampened, perhaps so
effectivelythattheir practical significance would diminishto
negligible proportions.
It is even conceivable that the effect of long cycles on the aggregate
income and output of the nation may be virtually eliminated with
considerable promptness. Many believe that fiscal and monetary
controls, at least in principle, could accomplish this. But it is not
within the realm of the plausible that long swings in every segment
of the economy would be suddenly stopped. For the past makes an
imprint on the present and on the future which cannot be easily
erased, even when the desire to do so is general and urgent. In
particular, a prolonged expansion has been under way in the capital
formation of the regulated industries as well as in that of residential
building since the mid-1930's. It was extended well beyond its usual
length by the effect of World War II and its aftermath. It was
characterized, like all such expansions, by an investment flow which
far exceeded the growth factors upon which it must depend in the
longer run.1 Thus, the physical stock of capital of all regulated
IForsubstantiation of this point in residential construction, see Leo Grebler, David
M. Blank, and Louis Winnick, Capital Formation in Residential Real Estate (Princeton
University Press for National Bureau of Economic Research, 1956), Chapter xviii.
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industries rose from 41.2 billion 1929 dollars at the beginning of 1946
to 48.4 billion at the end of 1950—an annual rate of increase of 3.3
per cent. This was approximately double the rate of growth of
population during the same period. Roughly the same relationship
has been extended into the mid-1950's. Yet the secular pattern of
growth, taking into account demand factors as well as the trend of
the capital-product ratio, suggests a long-run rate of increase in the
plant and equipment of the regulated industries which may be less
than that of population. It is of course possible that the maintenance
of steadier incomes for the population in the future than in the past
could promote a somewhat higher rate of secular growth for the
regulated industries than would otherwise prevail. But barring an
unforeseeable change in tastes or in technology, the difference would
at most be slight, since expansions have always compensated more
or less fully for the investment deficits incurred in contractions. The
growth rate of the regulated industries temporarily achieved in the
post-World War II period, as we have seen, is very substantially
above the long-term trend, and hence may sooner or later slacken.
This brings us to the second of the two problems that would remain
on the timing of future investment: when will the next contraction
in capital formation begin?
The lack of a fully tested and generally accepted theory of long
cycles restricts an answer to this question primarily to empirical
considerations. Long cycle expansions in the past have averaged
twelve years in length. The current expansion had by 1955 been
under way for some twenty years—four of which were war years
characterized by investment restriction. Assuming some minimum
comparability with the past, it would appear more likely that the
bulk of the future contraction will fall in the ten or fifteen years
ending in 1970 than in the ten or fifteen years ending in 1980. This
likelihood is consistent with the prospects for residential buildings;
the population pressures for housing are expected to be weaker in
the first of these periods than they were in the immediate past
or are likely to be in succeeding years.2 The close relationship
between long cycles in residential building and in the regulated
industries previously described is thus consistent with the outlook
for the incidence of these swings in the immediate future. On the
other hand, it must be emphasized that our knowledge of the causal
factors underlying long cycles is sketchy, at best. There are no
unassailable theoretical reasons for assigning any particular time
pattern for the long cycles 'of the future. Nor is our experience with
the past documented over a sufficiently extended period to accord
2Grebler,Blank, and Winnick, op. cit., Chapter xix.
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any considerable degree of reliability to a purely empirical forecast.
Hence, our first approach to the question of timing, though perhaps
the only one available, is not calculated to inspire confidence. Until
more is known concerning the factors underlying such phenomena,
our inability to predict their incidence, even in the broadest terms,
must be conceded. Moreover, it is worth reiterating, the power of
these cycles, as well as their impact upon the economy as a whole,
may well be mitigated in the future by counteractions on the part
of government and business which were unknown or but tentatively
employed in the years prior to World War II. If so, the tendency
for contractions to increase in intensity would be halted and re-
versed, to the distinct benefit of the nation's economic stability and
the welfare of its citizens. Obviously, the accumulation of knowledge
concerning these fluctuations must be ranked as one of the important
factors necessary for bringing this goal closer to realization.
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